VibeScamming: Guardio Asked Lovable to Phish, and Lovable Delivered the Whole Kit
- Date
- Apr 2025
- Tools involved
- Lovable
- Impact
- Lovable rated most abusable of the tools tested; it generated live phishing pages, credential-capture flows, and stolen-credential dashboards from simple prompts
- Root cause
- A generate-and-deploy platform with no meaningful guardrails against building and hosting phishing infrastructure
What happened
In April 2025, Guardio Labs published research it called 'VibeScamming,' introducing a benchmark to test how easily AI tools could be manipulated into helping a 'junior scammer' build a full phishing campaign. It compared ChatGPT, Claude, and the vibe-coding platform Lovable.
Lovable performed worst by a wide margin. Because it is purpose-built to generate and deploy web apps, it would produce near-perfect replicas of real login screens, including Microsoft's, wire up working credential-capture flows, deploy the pages live on deceptive subdomains, and even generate admin dashboards to track the stolen data. Guardio reported no meaningful guardrails or refusals along the way, and scored Lovable the most permissive of the tools tested.
The comparison tools fared better. ChatGPT's guardrails largely held, and Claude initially resisted but could be persuaded with 'security research' framing.
The Hacker News, GBHackers, and others covered the findings, and Lovable engaged with Guardio on abuse-reporting mechanisms afterward. VibeScamming became a key reference point for a specific shift: generative dev tools lowering the barrier to functional phishing infrastructure, not just phishing text.
Impact
No victim breach was reported here; the damage is capability. Guardio demonstrated that a low-skill scammer could get a pixel-perfect fake Microsoft login page, a working credential-capture flow, live hosting on a deceptive subdomain, and an admin dashboard for the stolen data, all from simple prompts to a single tool. Lovable scored as the most permissive platform tested, which made the benchmark itself the headline.
Root cause
Lovable's core strength was the problem: it is built to take a prompt, generate a working web app, and deploy it live. Pointed at a phishing request, that full pipeline (page design, credential capture, hosting, even a dashboard for the stolen data) shipped without meaningful guardrails or refusals. Chat-only tools that merely write text had more room to say no; a platform that deploys is handing over infrastructure.
How to not be this entry
- If you build or run a generative platform, red-team abuse before launch. Prompt your own tool to phish you, the way Guardio's 'junior scammer' persona did, and see how far it gets.
- Make refusals survive reframing. Claude held until 'security research' framing wore it down; a guardrail that folds to a magic phrase is a speed bump, not a control.
- Ship an abuse-reporting channel on day one. Lovable engaged with Guardio on abuse reporting after the research went public; doing it before the headline is cheaper.
- As a defender, assume convincing fake login pages are now cheap and instant. Train people to check domains rather than page quality, and prefer authentication that survives a perfect replica.
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Try Clerk →Frequently asked questions
What is VibeScamming?
VibeScamming is the name Guardio Labs gave its April 2025 research and benchmark measuring how easily AI tools could be manipulated into helping a 'junior scammer' build a complete phishing campaign. The study compared ChatGPT, Claude, and the vibe-coding platform Lovable, and Lovable scored as the most permissive by a wide margin.
What did Lovable actually generate in the VibeScamming tests?
From simple prompts, Lovable produced near-perfect replicas of real login screens including Microsoft's, wired up working credential-capture flows, deployed the pages live on deceptive subdomains, and generated admin dashboards to track stolen data. Guardio reported no meaningful guardrails or refusals during the process.
Did ChatGPT and Claude also build phishing pages in the Guardio study?
Not to the same degree. ChatGPT's guardrails largely held during the VibeScamming benchmark, and Claude initially resisted but could be persuaded with 'security research' framing. Lovable was rated the most permissive of the three tools tested.
How did Lovable respond to the VibeScamming research?
Following Guardio's publication, Lovable engaged with Guardio on abuse-reporting mechanisms. The research itself became a widely cited reference for how generative dev tools can lower the barrier to functional phishing infrastructure rather than just phishing text.
Sources
- Guardio Labs: VibeScamming, from prompt to phish, benchmarking AI agents' resistance to the dark side
- The Hacker News: Lovable AI found most vulnerable to VibeScamming techniques
- Cybersecurity News: VibeScamming, hackers using AI tools to build phishing campaigns
Related error guides
Lovable Supabase RLS not enabled: anyone can read your app's data (CVE-2025-48757)
Lovable API key exposed: secrets visible in your client-side code
No auth on your AI-generated API endpoints: anyone can call your backend
The Vibe Oops briefing
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